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FORGERY BY MEANS OF A RUBBER STAMP.
The late case of Robb v. Pennsylvania Company,1 presents
the novel question as to a bank's liability where a depositor,
without the bank's knowledge, procures a rubber stamp,
which is a substantial facsimile of his bank signature, and
which is stolen from his safe and used to obtain money from
the bank by means of forged checks. The trial court charged
the jury that it was not illegal per se to have such a stamp in
one's possession, and left it to them to decide whether or not
the plaintiff had been negligent in his manner of keeping the
stamp. It appeared that the stamp had been kept locked
in plaintiff's safe, and, of course, the jury found for the
plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the Superior Court, and the
judgment was affirmed, in an able opinion written by President
Judge Rice, by an unanimous court. The theory of the trial
judge as to the plaintiff's right of recovery depending upon
the absence of negligence in the manner of keeping the stanip
is accepted by the appellate court, which holds that the
depositor is bound to use such a stamp and keep it with pru-
dent care, so as to secure it against unlawful use by others.
The appellants contended for an application of the doctrine
that "where one of two innocent persons is to suffer from the
tortious act of a third, he who gave the aggressor the means
of doing the wrong must alone bear the consequences of the
act." 2 But the Superior Court held that this rule did not apply
in a case "where the two persons are not equally without
fault, but where one owes a duty to the other to do, or to
refrain from doing, a particular thing, and has failed in the
performance of that duty." The cases relative to the altera-
tion of negotiable instruments by filling up blanks left by the
maker were easily distinguished as containing an element of
13 Pa. Superior Court, 254 (1897) ; 186 Pa. 456 (I898).
2 Grant on Law of Bankers, 17; Morse on Banks and Banking, 2d Ed.
331; Van Schaack on Bank Checks, i ig; Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253
(1827) ; Garrard v. Hadden, 67 Pa. 82 (187o).
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either negligence or of agency. In passing, it is doubted by
the court whether the procurement of the stamp was the proxi-
mate cause of the loss.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania allowed an appeal from
this judgment. The case was argued before five justices, Mr.
Chief Justice Sterrett and Justices Green, Williams, McCollum,
and Fell. There was again an affirmance, but by a divided
court, Mr. Chief Justice Sterrett and Mr. Justice Williams
dissenting. The opinion of the court is written by Mr. Justice
McCollum, who adopts the conclusions and reasoning of the
lower courts as to negligence, saying:'
"If, however, the forger obtained possession of the stamp
through the negligence of the plaintiff, the responsibility for
the loss occasioned by the forgeries would not rest upon the
defendant if its cashier exercised due care in the inspection of
the check."
Mr. Justice Williams handed down a short dissenting
opinion some time after the opinion of the court was filed. In
this dissent the Chief Justice joined. Their opinion proceeds
upon the theory that the mark produced by the stamp was
identical with, and impossible to detect from, the plaintiff's
own signature, and that to hold the defendant liable would be
to place an additional burden upon it which was not contem-
plated by the contract of banking.
The case in hand, owing to the wide prevalence in the com-
munity of the use of autograph stamps, is of great importance,
and it becomes of more than academic interest to consider
whether the conclusions, reasoning and dicta of the court are
sound in principle.
It is somewhat difficult to grasp the theory upon which this
case was presented to the jury by the learned trial judge.
The court held,-as matter of law, that it was not negligence
in the plaintiff to procure the stamp to be made, or to have it
in his possession; the sole question for the jury being whether
he had taken prudent care of it thereafter. It would seem, if
the stamp were really a dangerous thing, and likely to be
I 186 Pa. 458 (1898).
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made an instrument of mischief, that the jury were entitled to
be heard as to whether the mere possession of such an article
was not negligence. If, on the other hand, the stamp was
harmless and not likely to cause damage, what was the neces-
sity for locking it up, and what question could there be for
the jury? In other words, the whole case, or nothing at all,
should have been left to the jury.
If the element of negligence is to be seriously considered,
the recent case of Knox v. Eden HZ'tsee,' decided by the New
York Court of Appeals, is of great interest. That was an
action for damages for negligence in not cancelling certificates
of stock and in thus permitting them to be used as security
for a loan. The certificates in question were delivered to the
company for surrender and cancellation, and for the issue of
new certificates in lieu thereof. These were so issued, but the
original certificates were not cancelled, but placed in a safe, of
which one of the clerks had the key. This clerk, with another,
took them out and hypothecated them to secure a loan made
to them by plaintiff. The principle upon which the case was
rested was that there was no negligence in placing these cer-
tificates in a safe from which they had been taken by the clerk
who was intrusted with the key of it and used by him. Chief
Justice Andrews, said:
"We are of opinion that the company was not chargeable
with any negligence which gives a right of action for the
injury caused to the plaintiff by the fraudulent use by Jurgens
of the surrendered certificates. The surrendered certificates
were placed by the company in its safe in its office, of which
Jurge s had the key, and thereby, it may be said, afforded
him the opportunity to commit the crime of which he was
guilty, in abstracting and uttering them as valid. But it is
not true, as a general rule, that a man may not intrust his
property to the custody of his servant, except at the peril of
losing his title thereto if the servant steals and disposes of it
to another. There must be something more than the mere
intrusting to a servant of the custody of a chattel, and the
1 148 N. Y. 458 (1896).
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consequent opportunity for theft, in order to preclude the
master from reclaiming it if stolen by the servant and sold to
another. (Rapallo, J., in McNdll v. Tentl National Bank.1)
The rule declared by Ashhurst, J., in Lickbarrow v. Mason
y2
frequently quoted, 'that whenever one of two innocent per-
sons must suffer by the act of a third, he who has enabled the
former to occasion the loss must sustain it,' has no application
to such a case."
Again, on page 46o, he says: " In other words, the claim
is that the company ought to have anticipated that Jurgens
might commit the crimes of forgery and larceny and put the
certificates on the market if they were left uncancelled under
his control. We do not assent to this suggestion. If the
company knew that Jurgens was dishonest, or had reason to
suspect his honesty, a different question would be presented.
But it is not generally an omission of ordinary prudence that
an employer deals with his employes on the assumption that
those who have hitherto been faithful in the performance of
their duties will continue so to be, or because he does not
anticipate and provide against the possibility of their criminal
acts. Breaches of trust and confidence unfortunately are not
infrequent. But honesty is, nevertheless, we believe, the gen-
eral rule of human conduct, and one may indulge in this
faith in human nature and trust those who have proved them-
selves worthy of it, without subjecting himself to a charge of
negligence if it should turn out that they afterwards yielded
to temptation and used their position to the injury of others.
It is one thing to say that a man shall be amenable for such
immediate consequences of his acts as a reasonable man might
foresee and dread and therefore shun. But it is another and
very different proposition to maintain that a man shall forfeit
his property because he has done an act which will not be
perilous unless others are guilty of misconduct which that
act does not cause."
It is submitted, however, (i) that while the plaintiff, Robb,
146 N. Y. 325 (1882).
2 2 T. R. 70 (1787).
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should undoubtedly have been allowed to recover, an unjust
burden was placed upon him by injecting into the case the
wholly irrelevant question of his negligence; and (2) that, the
decision not having been placed upon the proper grounds, the
courts were misled into erroneous dicta as to the law in case
the rubber stamp in question had not been locked in plaintiff's
safe, but had been left, in the language of the trial judge,
"lying around where people could probably stumble on it."
In People's Savings Bank v. Cupps,1 the by-laws of the sav-
ings bank provided that the pass-book must be presented at
the time of drawing money. The depositor allowed her son-
in-law to obtain possession of the pass-book, and he drew out
the money by means thereof in connectioi. with forged checks.
The by-laws provided that " when money is to be drawn out,
the book must be brought to the office to have the payment
entered therein." There was the further provision that
" If any person shall present a book and falsely allege him-
self or herself to be the depositor named therein and
thereby obtain the amount deposited, or any part thereof, this
institution will not be liable to make good any loss the actual
depositor may sustain thereby unless previous notice of his or
her book having been lost or taken shall have been given at
the office of the corporation."
It was held, that there was no evidence of contributory neg-
ligence on the plaintiff's part, and the bank must bear the loss.
The general rule has been stated as follows: "The bank,
when it receives money on deposit, agrees that such money
shall be paid out only on the order of its depositor; hence,
when it pays a forged check, it must be held to have
paid out its own funds, and cannot, therefore, charge its
depositor with the amount so paid out, but as against him the
bank must bear the loss, provided that the depositor has been
free from blame, and has not contributed to the forgery by his
negligence."'
191 Pa. 315 (1879).
25 Amer. & Eng. Encyci. of Law (Second Edition), 1o66 and cases
cited. For an interesting collection of cases on this subject, see Germania
Bank v. Boutell, 27 L. R. A. 635.
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In Georgia R., Etc., Co. v. Love, Etc., Soc., the depositor
did not know how to write his name, and the bank was
cognizant of this fact. A check was paid with his name
forged thereon. The court held: "When a bank receives
money on deposit from a person, it must be certain when it
pays it out, that it does so upon the depositor's order. It cannot
avoid liability by showing that it acted in good faith, and that
it believed from inquiry of the person presenting the checks,
that he was authorized to sign the name of the depositor to
the same. Under the facts of this case, the signatures were
forgeries and the bank is liable for the money paid out
thereon."
In Hardy v. Chesapeake Bank,2 the court, after stating the
well-settled rule that the relation between banker and customer
is that of debtor and creditor, and that the money received on
deposit becomes the funds of the bank, said: "There is no
question of trust, therefore, between the parties, but their rela-
tion is purely a legal one; and if the bank pays money on a
forged check, no matter under what circumstances of caution,
or however honest the belief in its genuineness, if the depositor
himself be free of blame, and has done nothing to mislead the
bank, all the loss must be borne by the bank,for it acts at its
peril, and pays out its own funds, and not those of the depositor.
It is in view of this relation of the parties and of their rights
and obligations that the principle is universally maintained that
banks and bankers are bound to know the signatures of their
customers and that they pay checks purporting to be drawn by
them at their peril."
In Leavitt v. Stanton,3 it was held that the facts that the
check was one of the printed checks used by the plaintiff
bank; that part of it, to wit, the name of the defendant bank,
was in the handwriting of one of the plaintiff's clerks; that it
must have come from the check book; that the book had
been kept upon the counter of the bank, an unusual place;
that the cashier had sent a letter of advice to the bank upon
1 85 Ga. 293 (189o).
2 51 Md. 585; 53 Amer. Rep. 325 (1879).
s Lalor's Suppl. to Hill & D. (N. Y.) 413 (1844).
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which the check was drawn enclosing the signature of the
party; and that the party paid Y4 per cent. premium for two
drafts of $3ooo and $5000, were not sufficient evidence of
negligence to charge the drawer bank on the forged draft.
And in Mackintosh v. Elliot zVa. Bank,' the bank paid
three checks purporting to be signed by the plaintiff which
had, however, been forged by the clerk. The forgery was
committed on a blank form, taken from the depositor's check
book which was lying about in his office during the day, and
the checks were stamped witlz the plaintiff's hand stamp. The
clerk was allowed to fill up checks and had been introduced
by the plaintiff to the bank as a proper person to receive
money on his checks. It was held, that these facts did not
exempt the bank from liability for the loss. See, also, Bank
of Ireland v. Evans's Clarities.
It is well settled that the relation of bank and banker does
not partake of a fiduciary character. " . . . The banker is
bound to return an equivalent by paying a similar sum to that
deposited with him when he is asked for it." The check must
bear the drawer's signature; the handwriting must be that of
the customer.-
The drawee is bound to know the signature of his drawer.
Hence, it has been held that if the banker or drawee makes a
payment or gives credit upon the strength of a forged signa-
ture, the loss must be his as between himself and the holder.4
The rule " that the banker is presumed to know the signa-
ture of his depositor, and that a loss arising from a forged
signature must be borne by the bank," was first announced by
Lord Mansfield, as long ago as 1762, in the leading case of
Price v. Neal,' and has received the approval of the authorities
since.6 In 1825, Mr. Justice Story said of the rule: " It has
1 123 Mass. 393 (1877).
5 H. L. Cas. 410 (i855).
'Grant on Law of Bankers (Fifth Edition), 2.
M orse on Banks and Banking, 762, and cases cited.
5 3 Burr, 1355.
6 See numerous cases cited; 2 Morse on Banks and Banking, 763;
4 Harvard Law Review, 297.
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never been departed from, and has always been deemed a
satisfactory authority." '
The rule seems founded upon the bed-rock of principle, and
made impregnable by every consideration of justice. Forgery,
it has been often said, can confer no civil rights and create no
civil liability. A forged deed is no deed.
The leading case of Price v. Neal forms the subject of an
able and interesting article from the pen of Professor Ames.2
The plaintiff was the drawee of a bill of exchange; the de-
fendant was an endorsee for value in due course. The bill
was paid on presentment, the drawee and holder being alike
ignorant that the signature of the ostensible drawer was
forged. Upon discovery of the forgery; the plaintiff sought to
recover the money on the ground that it had been paid under
a mistake. But the Court of King's Bench gave judgment
for the defendant. " The rule established by Price v. Neal,"
says Professor Ames, "that a drawee pays (or accepts) at his
peril a bill, on which the drawer's signature is forged, has
been repeatedly recognized," in England, in the United States,
in Scotland, and on the continent of Europe. The author,
after a critical discussion of the authorities, reaches the con-
clusion that the doctrine is entirely sound and is to be supported
on the theory that "equity will not interfere as between two
persons having equal equities, but will let the loss lie where it
has fallen." It would be a work of supererogation to attempt
to add anything to the author's learned remarks, but of course
there is an evident distinction between Price v. Neal and the
case now under discussion. It is the difference between the
position of a drawer and that of an endorsee. If the dra.wee
in Price v. Neal had sued the apparent drawer, whose name
had been forged, the analogy would be complete. It cannot
be conceived that he would have been allowed to recover.
And, as was said, in Smith v. M ercer,3 a banker "is even more
bound" to know a customer's handwriting than a drawee is
bound to know a drawer's.
See Levy v. Bank of U. S., 4 Dal. 234 (i8oo), the first case involving
this question decided in this country.
2 4 Harvard Law Review, 297 (1891).
36 Taunt. 76 (1815).
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Even Mr. Justice Williams in his dissenting opinion1
recognizes the general rule here contended for, saying:
"When an account is opened at a bank by the deposit of
money, the depositor leaves his genuine signature with the
banker for his guidance and protection in the payment of
checks. When checks are presented bearing this signature,
they must not be refused; but if the signature is a forgery, no
matter how skilfully it is done, or how difficult of detection,
they must not be paid. The contract which the commercial
law raises upon the deposit of money with a banker is that
the deposit shall be paid out only to the depositor or his
order. Payment upon a forged check, is therefore, no pay-
ment, and in no way affects the depositor."
It is submitted that the learned President of the Superior
Court correctly laid down the law as to a bank's duty when
he said :2
"A bank is bound to know the signature of its depositors,
and if it pay out money on a forged check it cannot charge
the depositor with the amount, but as against him must bear
the loss." '
In what respect does the case at bar differ from any other
forgery? The signature on the check was undoubtedly not
the signature of the depositor or made by his authority. That
it was very similar to, or even almost indistinguishable from, the
plaintiff's real signature, cannot be allowed to alter the case;
otherwise the bank could defend on the ground that the
forgery was so clever, the likeness so striking, that, notwith-
standing the utmost care and diligence on its part, it was
impossible to detect the difference. To hold that a bank
might ever pay a forged check, that is to say, a check which
really did not bear the signature of the drawer, and charge it
'July 21, i898, 40 At. 969.
23 Pa. Superior Court, 262 (1897).
3 This language seems to have been adopted from Van Schaack on Bank
Checks, O5. Van Schaack cites: Bank v. Bank, 3 N. Y. 230 (1848);
La Borde v. Ass'n, 4 Rob. (La.) igo (1843); Bank v. Bank, 46 N. Y. 77
(1862); Bank v. Bank, 30 Md. ii (i868); Bernheimer v. Marshall, 2
Minn. 28 (1858) ; Mackintosh v. Bank, 125 Mass. 393 (,878); Bank v.
Picker, 7x Ill. 439 (1877) ; Bank v. Bank, lo Vt. 141 (1838).
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to his account, would be to introduce a startling principle into
the law of banking. To state such a contention is to refute it.
The bank's duty is an absolute one, not one involving ordinary
(or extraordinary) care. In a word, it is a bank's business to
know its depositors' signatures. When the depositor sues for
his account, and shows that the money was actually deposited
with the defendant, the burden is upon the defendant to prove
that it has paid out the money to the plaintiff or upon his
order. If the depositor has signed a check and negligently
allowed it to be stolen, or has so filled it out that the amount
can be changed without ready detection, the loss, of course, is
the depositor's, because the order to pay was his. The plain
distinction between this class of cases and the autograph stamp
case is that in the former the signature is that of the depositor,
-the order to pay is his; in the latter it is not.
Two vital and controlling facts seem to have been over-
looked as well by counsel as by the courts. These are: (i)
that anyone could have obtained the depositor's signzature and
procured to be made therefrom a rubber stamp in imitation
thereof; and (2) that the likeness produced by any stamp is
not, and of necessity cannot be, an exact facsimile of the real
signature, so as to deceive either an expert or a novice exer-
cising ordinary care.
As to the first point, it is admitted by the courts that the
stamp was a "necessary and useful" thing; that it was not
unlawful to have one made and in one's possession. How,
then, can there be any legal liability from the misuse of this
lawful, innocent, labor-saving device? Because it is used to
deceive a third person? But anyone else could obtain such
a stamp and use it for a similar purpose, and it behooves the
bank, at its peril, to be on the lookout for such deceptions.
Again, to consider the second point, it is impossible to make
a stamp which willproduce an impression that is indistinguishable
from a pen-and-ink autograph. Mr. Justice Williams' remarks
to the contrary can only be regarded, with all deference, as
resulting from a singular misapprehension of fact. The im-
pression from rubber can never so simulate the clear-cut
outlines of a pen as to seem, to clear eyes, a replica. Hun-
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dreds of experts and thousands of laymen would testify to this
fact. The writer has seen the impressions from many auto-
graph stamps, but never one which could not be detected at
a glance, even without comparison with the original signa-
ture.
A paying teller who accepts such a check must be guilty of
gross negligence. The best proof of this, perhaps, is the cir-
cumstance that this is not an accepted method offorgery. The
pen-and-ink imitations have been much more successful. The
stamp forgery has never obtained criminal vogue, because so
evidently likely to fail.
If it were possible to produce a stamp, the impression of
which would defy discrimination from the original, or even
casual expert inspection, the alert forger would long ago have
exploited in many instances this ready means of victimizing
the banks. It has not been done because it was not practical
from the criminal standpoint.
It being undoubted that a bank is bound, at its peril, to
know its depositors' signatures, it follows that it cannot defend
on the ground of payment on a stamp-forged signature,
whether the stamp was procured to be made by the depositor
himself, or by a third person. The depositor is not chargeable
with negligence because, first,.he only does what anyone else
can do, and second, because, if there is any additional peril
created, it is one against which the bank is bound to guard,
and no one need presume that another will be negligent.
It is to be deplored that the law on this very clear point
should be unsettled by the dissent of two out of the five
learned justices sitting when the case was argued in the
Supreme Court. And it is also to be regretted that doubt
has been thrown, by unnecessary dicta, upon the true rule
governing such cases.
To recapitulate, my contentions are briefly these:
i. A bank is bound, at its peril, to know the signatures of
its customers and to pay only checks properly signed.
2. A bank cannot, in any event, defend on the ground of a
payment on a stamp-forged check any more than on a payment
on any other forgery, because,
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(a) The depositor's possession of such a stamp is entirely
legal and is no evidence of negligence.
(b) Anyone else could procure a similar stamp.
(c) Such a stamp cannot be made so as to deceive the
initiated or the ordinarily prudent.
3. The conclusion reached in Robb v. Pennsylvania Co.
is correct, so far as allowing a recovery is concerned, but
binding instructions should have been given for the plaintiff,
irrespective of the plaintiff's careful keeping of the stamp.
Ira Jewell Williams.
Philadelphia, September, 1898.
